05/05/2026

Court of Appeal dismisses CPR 52.30 application seeking to reopen refusal of permission to appeal in Magomedov

Following a hearing on 27 March 2026, the Court of Appeal (CoA) has dismissed an unusual CPR 52.30 application brought by the underlying claimants in Magomedov and Others v TPG and Others [2025] EWHC 59 (Comm) seeking to reopen the decision of Lord Justice Males of 20 June 2025 refusing them permission to appeal (PTA) the judgment of Mr Justice Bright of 17 January 2025.

Mr Justice Bright had granted the defendants’ joint application challenging the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the claimants’ claim and/or seeking to strike out the same claim. The claimants then sought permission to appeal his decision, relying on 23 separate grounds of appeal. Mr Justice Males refused them permission on 10 June 2025 on all 23 grounds.

On 30 April 2026, Lord Justices Moylan and Miles handed down a judgment dismissing the claimants’ CPR 52.30 application to re-open that PTA decision.

Paul Lowenstein KC and Colleen Hanley act for Halimeda, the ninth defendant to the underlying claim and one of the successful respondents to the CPR 52.30 application.

The judgment

In their judgment, LJJ Moylan and Miles affirmed the application of the principles first enunciated in Municipio de Mariana v BHP Group Plc [2021] EWCA Civ 1156, [2022] 1 WLR 191 (Mariana) confirming [26–33]:

1. When giving reasons on an application for PTA the degree of detail which is appropriate depends on the case and that “there are very many applications for PTA which can be and are appropriately dealt with in a few sentences”.
2. The circumstances described in CPR 52.30(1) are “truly exceptional”. That jurisdiction can only be properly invoked where it is demonstrated that the integrity of the earlier proceedings has been critically undermined.
3. Matters such as that the decision about PTA was wrong or that the amounts in issue were very large or the points in issue were important are not of themselves sufficient to displace the fundamental public importance of the need for finality.
4. There must be a powerful probability that the decision in question would have been different if the integrity of the earlier proceedings had not been critically undermined.
5. There must be a powerful probability that a significant injustice has already occurred, and that reconsideration is the only effective remedy.
6. An application for reconsideration of a refusal of permission to appeal may usefully be approached in two stages: (i) the court should ask whether the appellate judge who refused permission to appeal grappled with the issues raised by the application for permission, or whether they wholly failed so to do; and (ii) if the appellate judge did grapple with the issues when refusing permission to appeal, the court should ask whether, in so doing, a mistake was made that was so exceptional, such as wholly failing to understand a point that was clearly articulated, which corrupted the whole process and where, but for that error, there would probably have been a different result. To this sixth test, the CoA added further guidance, that the requirement that there would probably have been a different result applies to each stage: i.e. either where the appellate judge has failed to grapple with a point or where they have grappled with a point but made an exceptional mistake of the relevant kind. The CoA confirmed that the need to show a powerful probability of a different result imports a high test of materiality.
7. Finally, the appellate judge should address (“grapple with”) the essential points raised by the grounds and identify why in their view the point in question does not satisfy the test for the grant of PTA. The CoA expressly held that concept of “grappling with” the issue does not connote any particular degree of detail but rather “what is required depends on the case.”

Applying all of the above to LJ Males’ decision to refuse PTA, the CoA concluded that the complaints in the claimants’ grounds of appeal were in reality “about the application of the law to the evidence and the judge’s evaluative conclusions”. As such, the CoA was not persuaded it was necessary to reopen the PTA decision “in order to avoid real injustice”. The CoA concluded that it was unnecessary to therefore consider whether there is an “alternative effective remedy” under the third cumulative limb of CPR 52.30.

This detailed CoA judgment provides welcome further context and clarity on the application of the rarely deployed but important jurisdiction available under CPR 52.30 to reopen a refusal of PTA. It also provides much needed guidance and interpretation on the meaning of the rather ambiguous phrase “failed to grapple with”.

Paul Lowenstein KC and Colleen Hanley were instructed by Yuri Botiuk and James Collins of Collins Botiuk.

Blair Leahy KC is instructed for the eighth defendant in the main proceeding, Domidias, by Lydia Danon of Cooke, Young & Keidan LLP.